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activity on the part of any of them. They have merely sought
to stand on their constitutional right to take the one and only
oath which the Constitution prescribed. On this stand I unqualifiedly join them.
I would, therefore, grant the writ prayed for and restore
petitioner to his position.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied November 14, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the
petition should be granted.

[L. A. No. 22035.

In Bank. Oct. 17, 1952.]

JUNE HIRSCHMAN et al., .Appellants, v. COUNTY OF
LOS .ANGELES et al., Respondents.
[1] Public Employees-Oath-Form.-A county civil service employee may properly be directed by the board of supervisors
to swear that he is not, and since December 7, 1941, has not
been, a member of any organization which advocates the overthrow of the government by force, except those which he may
list, including those specifically named if they should ever
be determined by a court of law to advocate such overthrow,
since such direction, when properly construed, requires him
to designate only those of the named organizations which he
knows advocates overthrow of the government by force, or
which to his knowledge has been held by a court to advocate
such action.
[2] !d.-Oath-Persons Included.-Gov. Code, § 1360 et seq., requiring all officers to take the constitutional oath, did not
apply to all persons in p-qblic employment, and the field of
loyalty oath requirements for all persons in county service
was not preempted by statute until the adoption of the Levering Act (Gov. Code, §§ 3100-3109) which expressly requires
all county employees to take the oath prescribed therein.
(Opinion on denial of rehearing.)

.APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
.Angeles County. W. Turney Fox, Judge. .Affirmed.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Public Officers, §52; Am.Jur., Public Officers,
§ 7.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Public Employees.
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Proceeding in mandamus to compel county civil service
commission to set aside its decision upholding discharge of
county employees for failure to sign an oath of office. Judgment denying writ affirmed.
Margolis & McTernan, John T. McTernan, William B.
Murrish, Wirin, Rissman & Okrand, A. L. Wirin, Fred Okrand and Nanette Dembitz for Appellants.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Gerald G. Kelly,
Assistant County Counsel, and Robert L. Trapp, Deputy
County Counsel, for Respondents.
GIBSON, C. J.-Plaintiffs, permanent civil service employees of the county of JJOS Angeles, were discharged because they refused to execute the oath and affidavits prescribed
by orders of the county board of supervisors made in 1947
and 1948. * The county civil service commission sustained
the discharges after a hearing upon stipulated facts, and plaintiffs sought a writ of mandate in the superior court to compel
their reinstatement and the payment of wages retroactive to
the date of discharge. This appeal was taken from the judgment denying the requested relief.
The oath and affidavits are as follows:

''A. OATH OF OI<'l"ICE OR EJ\fPLOYJ\fENT
"I,
____ do solemnly swear (or affirm) that
I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States
and. the Constitution and laws of the State of California,
against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true
faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation
freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion;
and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of
the office or employment on which I am about to enter or am
nOW eugaged. SO HELP ME GOD.
"B. AFFIDAVIT RE SuBVERSIVE AcTIVITY
"I do further swear (or affirm) that I do not advocate, nor
am I now a member, nor have I been since December 7, 1941,
•·The oath and affidavits as originally adopted in August, 1947, were
upheld by the District Court of Appeal in Steiner v. Darby, 88 Cal.
App.2d 481 [199 P.2d 429]. On December 5, 1949, under the title of
Parker v. Los Angeles County, 338 U.S. 327 [70 S.Ot. 161, 94 L.Ed. 144],
writs of certiorari were dismissed by the United States Supreme Court on
the ground that the federal questions presented were ''not ripe for
decision. ' '
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a member of any political party or organization that advo"
cates the overthrow of the Government of the United States
or State of California, or County of Los Angeles, by force or
violence, except those specified as follows : - - - - - - - (the organizations here to be listed embrace all organizations
advocating the overthrow of government by force or violence
including any of the hereinafter named if they should ever
be determined by a court of law to advocate the overthrow
of government by force or violence) ; and that during such
time as I am an officer or employee of the County of Los Angeles, I will not ad vocate nor become a member of any political
party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the
Government of the United States, or State of California, or
County of Los Angeles, by force or violence.
'' C.

AFFIDAVIT RE ALIASES

"I do further swear (or affirm) that I have never used
or been known by any names other than those listed as
follows:
''D. MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS
"I do further swear (or affirm) that I have never been a
member of, or directly or indirectly supported or followed
any of the hereinafter listed organizations, except those that I
indicate by an X mark." [Next follows a list of 142 organizations which were selected from those mentioned in one or
more of the reports of the Joint Fact-Finding Committee of
the California Legislature on Un-American Activities in
California.]
All of the facts pertinent to this case were stipulated to by
the parties when the matter was before the county civil service commission. It appears that plaintiffs were given an opportunity to take the oath and make the affidavits but did not
do so. '!'hereafter, on April 27, 1948, the board of supervisors
ordered all department heads to direct the employees under
them to execute the oath and affidavits immediately. Plaintiffs were advised of this order and were informed that refusal
to comply would be considered insubordination. On or about
May 5th plaintiffs refused to obey the order on the ground
that the oath and affidavits were unconstitutional.
On July 20th a new order was adopted by the supervisors
which provided as follows: '' ( 1) 'fhat unless the employee
executes parts A, B and C of the oath and affidavit attached
hereto and made a part of this order, by 5:00P.M. on the 26th
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day of July, 1948, that the department head will discharge
such employee at that time. (2) That if the employees refuse on the 26th day of July, 1948, to execute paragraph D
of said oath and affidavit they will be discharged for such
refusal if and when the loyalty test litigation now pending
is :finally concluded with a determination that the County was
justified in requiring from its employees the information embodied in paragraph D." Thereupon plaintiffs were directed
by the heads of their departments to execute ''parts A, B and
C of said oath and affidavit," and they refused to take "the
oath and affidavit or parts A, Band C" within the prescribed
time. Plaintiffs were notified that they were discharged as of
July 26th on the ground of insubordination because of refusal
to execute the oath and affidavits in full on May 5th, and refusal to execute parts A, B and C pursuant to the order of
July 20th.
The civil service commission held a hearing to review the
discharges, and on November 23, 1948, it found and concluded
that plaintiffs' "failure to sign the Loyalty Oath and Paragraphs A, B, and C of the Affidavit, after having been ordered
to do,'' justified their dismissals for insubordination. The
decision of the commission makes no reference to paragraph
D or to plaintiffs' failure to take the oath and make all of the
affidavits as directed by the supervisors in their order of April
27, 1948. As noted above, the board's order of ,July 20, 1948,
provided that employees who refused to execute part D "will
be discharged for such refusal if and when the loyalty test
litigation now pending is finally concluded with a determination that the County was justified in requiring from its employees the information embodied in paragraph D." The
"pending" litigation referred to by the supervisors (Steiner
v. Darby, 88 Cal.App.2d 481 [199 P.2d 429]) was not finally
concluded when the civil service commission rendered its decision sustaining the discharges. Therefore, under the terms
of the board's order, the commission could not properly consider plaintiffs' failure to execute part D as a ground for dismissal, and the commission's decision shows that it was based
on and restricted to plaintiffs' refusal to execute paragraphs
A, B and C. The trial court concluded .that plaintiffs' refusal
to execute parts A, B and C constituted insubordination and
sufficient cause for discharge, and in view of the commission's
decision we may disregard the further conclusion of the trial
court that plaintiffs' earlier refusal to execute paragraphs
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A, B, C and D likewise furnished sufficient cause for dismissal. It follows that we need not pass upon the issues raised
with respect to part D, and inasmuch as plaintiffs stipulate
that they do not have, and never did have, any objection
to paragraphs A and C, the validity of paragraph B is all
that remains to be considered.
Substantially the same provisions as appear in paragraph
B are to be found in the oath prescribed by the Levering Act
(Gov. Code, §§ 3100-3109), the validity of which was upheld
in Packman v. Leona1·d, ante, p. 676 [249 P.2d 267] .*
There is only one difference between the two which requires
discussion. [1] The employee is directed by paragraph B
to swear that he is not, and since December 7, 1941, has not
been, a member of an organization which advocates the overthrow of the government by force, except those which he lists
in a space provided for that purpose, and immediately under
this space appears the following: '' (the organizations here to
be listed embrace all organizations advocating the overthrow
of government by force or violence including any of the hereinafter named if they should ever be determined by a court
of law to advocate the o:verthrow of government by force
or violence).'' 'l'he ''hereinafter named'' organizations referred to are those listed in paragraph D, and the county
concedes that each employee was expected merely to fill out
the form in accordance with his information on the date that
he executed the document. The quoted language, when properly construed, required plaintiffs to designate only those of
the named organizations which they knew advocated overthrow of the government by force, or which to their knowledge had been held by a court to advocate such action. They
were not required to speculate upon what the courts might
determine in the future. As thus interpreted, the requirement was sufficiently certain to be understood and applied,
and it must be sustained under our decision in Packman v.
Leonard, ante, p. 676 [249 P.2d 267], that public employees may properly be required to furnish information regarding their memberships in organizations which, to their
*The Levering Act did not go into effect until after plaintiffs were
discharged, and the question of its operation is not involved here. It
may be noted, however, that the oath and affidavits which are before us
in the present case cannot now be properly required by the county, since
the Levering Act has fully occupied the field of legislation on the subject
of loyalty oaths for public employees in California. (Bowen v. County
of Los Angeles, post, p. 714 [249 P.2d 285]; cf. Fraser v. Regents
of University of California, post, p. 717 [249 P.2d 283].)
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knowledge, have advocated the overthrow of the government
by force and violence.
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Pockman v. Leonard, this clay filed, ante, p. 676 [249 P.2d 267],
I would reverse the judgment with directions to the trial court
to issue a writ of mandate in accordance with the prayer of
plaintiffs' complaint.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied November
14, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition
should be granted.
The following opinion was then rendered:
THE COURT.-[2] In their petition for rehearing plaintiffs, who are civil service employees of Los Angeles County,
claim that the county oath should be invalidated on the
ground that the field of loyalty oath requirements for all
public employees had been fully occupied by sections 1360
et seq. of the Government Code which provide that every
officer shall take the constitutional oath before entering upon
the duties of his office. The term "officer" as used therein
clearly includes both state and county officers (see § 1363 (b)),
but the provisions requiring execution of the oath do not
mention employees and cannot reasonably be read as applying
to all persons in public employment. That the Legislature
had no such intent was made clear by the enactment of Government Code, sections 18150 et seq., which specifically extend
the oath requirement to all state employees. These latter
sections would obviously have been unnecessary and meaningless if sections 1360 et seq. were construed as petitioners
urge.
There is nothing in Tolman v. Underhill, post, p. 708
[249 P.2d 280], which is inconsistent with our interpretation
of sections 1360-1363 of the Government Code, since the case
does not hold that those provisions, standing alone, require
all public employees to take the prescribed oath. The opinion
proceeds on the theory that sections 1360-1363 and 18150,
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must be read together in order to cover all persons in sta.te
service, both officers and employees.
Nor is any different interpretation of sections 1360-1363
required by reason of our holding in Packman v. Leonard,
ante, p. 676, 683-684 [249 P.2d 267], that all persons
in public employment are protected by the constitutional prohibition against the imposition of religious or political tests
as a qualification for ''any office or public trust.'' Our construction of the language of the prohibition as running in
favor of all public employees does not constitute a holding
that all such persons must execute the constitutional oath and
obviously does not compel us to interpret the term "officer" in
section 1360 as applying to all persons in public employment.
Government Code, sections 18150 et seq., clearly have no
application to persons employed by a county, and under
Government Code, sections 1360-1363, the only persons in
county service who are required to take the constitutional oath
are officers. The field of loyalty oath requirements for all
persons in county service was not preempted by statute until
the adoption of the Levering Act which expressly requires all
county employees to take the oath prescribed therein. (See
Bowen v. County of Los Angeles, post, p. 714, 715-716 [249
P.2d 285].)
The petition for rehearing is denied.
C~RTER, J.-Dissenting.
I agree with petitioners that the holdings in the so-called
loyalty oath cases are inconsistent and irreconcilable, and
it seems to me that the supplemental opinion this day filed
does not clarify but adds to the confusion which is the
inevitable result of an attempt to reach a certain conclusion
without pursuing a course of logical reasoning.
Government Code, section 1360, sets forth an oath identical
with that prescribed in section 3, articl.e XX, of the Constitution. Section 1360(3) provides that the oath applies to
"officers elected or appointed for any county." In Packman v.
Leonard, ante, p. 676, 684 [249 P.2d 267], it was held
that the word "officers" in section 3 of the Constitution
applied to "every state and local officer and employee" and
that such persons could not be required to take any oath
but that set forth in the Constitution or one substantially
identical thereto. Petitioners argue that the word "officer"
in section 1363 ( 3) should be given a similar interpretation
and that they, as county employees, were required to take
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the oath set forth in section 1360 and that, as in Tolman v.
Underhill, post, p. 708 [249 P.2d 280], the Legislature
had preempted the field so as to invalidate the county oath.
In the Tolman case, post, pp. 708, 712, the court said
that "Although the adoption of local rules supplementary
to state law is proper under some circumstances, it is well
settled that local regulation is invalid if it attempts to
impose additional requirements in a field which is fully
occupied by statute (citations) . . . " and "As we have
already seen, the Legislature has enacted a general and detailed scheme requiring all state employees to execute a prescribed oath relating to loyalty and faithful performance of
duty, and it could not have intended that they must at the
same time remain subject to any such additional loyalty oaths
or declarations as the particular agency employing them might
see fit to impose. Multiplicity and duplication of oaths and
dedarations would not only reflect seriously upon the digm"ty
of state employment but would make a travesty of the effort to
secure loyal and suitable persons for government service."
This court now, after holding in Packman v. Leonard,
supra, that the word "officers" in the Constitution applies
to every state and local officer and employee, seeks to distinguish this case on the ground that section 1363 (b) cannot
''reasonably be read as applying to all persons in public
employment. That the Legislature had no such intent was
made clear by the enactment of Government Code section
18150 et seq., which specifically extend the oath requirement
to all state employees." It is also said that Tolman v. UnderhilT, supra, is not inconsistent with the interpretation given
sections 1360-1363 of the Government Code, "since the case
does not hold that those provisions, standing alone, require all
public employees to take the prescribed oath. The opinion
proceeded on the theory that sections 1360-1363 and 18150
et seq. must be read together in order to cover all persons
in state service, both officers and employees." It appears to
me that the argument used here is inconsistent with the
statement in Packman v. Leonard. Why should the word
''officers'' be given a different interpretation in construing
the Constitution from that given it in construing section 1360
et seq. of the Government Code ? Article 4 of title 1, of the
Government Code is entitled "Oath of Office" (not "Oath of
Office" for county officers) and chapter 4, title 2, is entitled
39 C.2d-23

706

HIRSCHMAN v. CouNTY oF Los .ANGELES

[39 C.2d

"Oaths for State Employees." But the latter provision relates back to .Article 4 for the ''Method and manner of taking,
subscribing, and filing oath: Nonmember of civil service"
(see section 18152). Both section 1360 (which is said to
apply to county officers only) and section 18150 provide that
the affiant will faithfully discharge ''the office of - - " to
the best of his ability; yet one is said to relate to officers only
and the other to employees and that one may not include
the other .
.As the majority of the court said in Packman v. Leonard,
supra, "We are unable to find any place where a line can
reasonably be drawn so as to place some positions within
and others outside the constitutional prohibition, and, in our
opinion, there is no justification for excluding any public
servants from its protection. The prohibition should therefore
be rrmd as applying to every state and local officer and
employee. This construction is in accord with the basic
purpose of safeguarding the public and its servants by forbidding oaths and declarations regarding matters that bear
no reasonable relationship to governmental service and particulculy those that involve political and religious beliefs.
Persons in the lower levels of government are just as much
entitled to this protection as those in higher positions.''
(Emphasis ours.) The supplemental opinion states that
Packman v. Leonard, supra, holds that all persons in public
employment are ptotected by the constitutional prohibition
against ''the imposition of religious or political tests as a
qualification for 'any office or public trust.' " The oath there
was specifically held not to constitute either a religious or
politiral test. I am of the opinion that the holding in the
Pockman case goes farther than the court now decides that
it went. It is my understanding that the word "officers"
there was held to include all employees, but that the oath
involved in that case did not substantially differ from the
constitutional oath. I am of the opinion now, as I was then
(see dissent, Packman v. Leonard, ante, p. 676 [249 P.2d
267] ) , that if there is no difference between the two, then
the Levering .Act is a nullity.
In the Tolman case it was held that the state Legislature
had expressly provided that the constitutional oath was
required of every state employee and, "by a series of statutes,
has enacted a general and comprehensive scheme relating to
execution and filing of the oath by all such persons'' and
that "Where the Legislature has adopted statutes governing
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a pa1·ticular subject matter, its intent with regard to occupying the field to the exclusion of all local regulation is not
to be measured alone by the language used but by the whole
purpose and scope of the legislative scheme.'' What was said
in the Tolman case with respect to legislative preemption
of th8 field is as applicable to county employees as it was
to state employees and it is my opinion that they may be
required to take only the constitutional oath which is set
forth in sections 1360 et seq. of the Government Code together with the method and manner of taking the same. There
is no merit to the argument that the constitutional oath provision is not self-executing; the Legislature has provided that
the oath there set forth shall be taken and the manner in
which it is to be done in that article of the Government
Code ( 4) entitled "Oath of Office." Therefore, if the Legislature did not preempt the field by the last mentioned statutes,
it certainly did not do so by the Levering Act. Furthermore,
if the Legislature could not prescribe any other oath than
that set forth in section 3 of article XX of the Constitution,
such restriction should apply to all other legislative bodies
in the state, and thus render the oath here involved invalid.
I would therefore grant a rehearing in this and all companion cases.

